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Introduction 
The extent to which organized criminal use of the Internet poses a threat to national or 
international security depends upon two basic definitional issues: 1) What is security?  and 2) 
What is organized crime? This essay addresses these issues, and then proceeds to a discussion 
of situations in which security has been threatened, or is likely to be, by organized 
cybercriminal activity. The increasing pervasiveness of digital technology makes its 
continuing exploitation for criminal purposes inevitable. Some of these may threaten security, 
but others not. 
What is security? 
The concept of national security has been broadened in recent years. Traditionally, it was 
limited to a state’s capacity to defend its territorial borders against the invading armed forces 
of rival nation states. Later, it was extended to embrace state capacity to provide for the basic 
well-being of its citizens.1 More recently, it has been expanded further to embrace such 
broader considerations as human security, with its greater focus on groups and individuals.2 
However, this more expansive notion is hardly new. Consider the following observation, 
made over two thousand years ago: 
Plans and projects for harming the enemy are not confined to any one method.  Sometimes entice his 
wise and virtuous men away so that he has no counsellors.  Or send treacherous people to his country 
to wreck his administration.  Sometimes use cunning deceptions to alienate his ministers from the 
sovereign.  Or send skilled craftsmen to encourage his people to exhaust their wealth.  Or present him 
with licentious musicians and dancers to change his customs.  Or give him beautiful women to 
bewilder him.3 
If indeed military strength remains the foundation of security today, it in turn depends upon 
other basic factors. These include a strong economy, and a well-educated, healthy, productive 
and cohesive citizenry. Moreover, the pervasiveness of digital technology has profound 
security implications. In the developed world at least, critical infrastructure such as power 
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generation, telecommunications, finance, and defence systems are all supported by, and 
dependent upon,  digital technology. Sun Tzu’s broad thinking is as relevant now as it was 
during his lifetime. 
Not all security threats emanate from state action. Some arise from natural causes. Pandemics 
and extreme weather events can weaken more vulnerable states. Non-state actors, at least 
those perceived to be enemies of the state, have long been regarded as threats to security, 
both internal and external.  This was reinforced by the events of September 11, 2001.  With 
the end of the Cold War, and the significant increase in recreational drug use in Western 
nations, the security implications of conventional criminality began receiving greater 
attention. Transnational crime (most of it organized) was most prominently deemed to be a 
security threat in President Clinton’s address to the United Nations General Assembly in 
1995.4 
There is, of course, an element of ambiguity to the concept of national security. Just as 
individuals may be paranoid or hypochondriac, so too may leaders and their publics suffer 
unwarranted anxiety. Things may be perceived as intensely threatening to some, when they 
are objectively trivial. Predictions of Doomsday are frequently made, but have yet to be 
realized. Ironically, the sources of some anxiety can prove to be positively beneficial.  J. 
Edgar Hoover, former Director of the FBI, regarded the civil rights movement of the 1960s as 
a national security threat.5 The Nixon administration argued that publication of the Pentagon 
Papers would jeopardise the national security of the United States.6 More recently a member 
of the US Congress referred to Wikileaks as presenting “a clear and present danger to the 
national security of the United States.” 7 
Threats to security may be invoked cynically, for ulterior motives. Some leaders raise the 
spectre of security threat for domestic political purposes. The Nixon White House asserted 
national security as justification for terminating investigation of the Watergate burglary.8 As 
we will see, claims that organized cybercrime threaten national security are not uncommon. 
Some may in fact be valid, but none should be uncritically accepted at face value. The term 
“hypersecuritization” applies as much to cyberspace as it does on the Earth’s surface.9 
What is organized crime? 
Organized crime lacks a universally accepted meaning. Klaus von Lampe has identified no 
less than 150 definitions of organized crime.10  Whatever one’s preferred definition, the 
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conventional conception of organized crime is out of date, having been overtaken by the 
evolution of the phenomenon itself.  The classic “mafia model” that served as the basis of 
Cressey’s11 analysis of four decades ago conjured up visions of ethnically-based, monolithic, 
hierarchical organizations ruled by “Mr Bigs.” By the 1990s, observers of criminal 
organizations reported that rather than the work of formal, enduring structures, a significant 
amount of criminal activity was undertaken by loose coalitions of smaller groups converging 
temporarily to exchange goods and services.12 The idea of vertically integrated enterprises 
thus gave way to the metaphor of networks,13 which provided a foundation for contemporary 
thinking about the interrelationships within organized criminal groups and between individual 
groups.   
Developments in organizational and criminal life have evolved rapidly in recent years, 
leaving some definitions of organized crime too narrow and too constrained by ideology. 
Traditional definitions of organised crime have tended to be based on the profit motive. 
However, even the most insightful observers of “terrestrial” organized crime note the 
intrinsic attraction of excitement, comradeship and other non-material values. As we shall 
see, a great deal of organized criminal activity on the internet is driven primarily by non-
monetary considerations. These include the quest for intellectual challenge, individual or 
group notoriety, lust (in the case of organized paedophile activity), ideology, rebellion, and 
curiosity. Today, there are many criminal organizations that do not practice violence or 
engage in bribery.  Moreover, the traditional view of criminal organizations consisting of full 
or part time professional criminals was also somewhat simplistic.  Some criminal 
organizations have explicit or implicit membership, but may also include a variety of 
hangers-on, camp followers, and accomplices, some of whom will be well aware of their 
complicity in criminal enterprise, while others may not. 
The boundaries of organized crime are not always clear cut. One of the more interesting 
manifestations of conceptual convergence concerns the intersection of organized crime and 
terrorism.  Terrorism, too, can be a slippery term. The definition of terrorism employed here 
is the following: “An act or threat of violence to create fear and/or compliant behavior in a 
victim or wider audience for the purpose of achieving political ends.”14 The underscored 
words are important. Organized criminals have been known to engage in acts of terrorism: 
The assassinations of Italian Judges Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino were political 
statements as much as they were Mafia “hits.” Much terrorism is undertaken collectively, 
with varying degrees of organization. Most terrorist acts are, by definition, criminal acts. 
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There is also a degree of occupational mobility across definitional boundaries. Some 
criminals become terrorists, and some terrorists give up the political struggle for a life of 
crime. Some criminal and terrorist organizations collaborate. The terms “crime-terrorism 
continuum” “fighters turned felons” and “marriages of convenience” are illustrative.15  
Today, it requires an exceptionally closed mind to deny that states are also capable of 
criminal acts. Throughout recorded history, crimes by state actors have occurred in times of 
peace, as well as during armed conflicts. Most recently, one notes allegations of drug 
manufacture and counterfeiting by agents of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.16 
States have also engaged periodically in kidnapping and assassination, at home and abroad. 
Today, the business of the International Criminal Court is booming, notwithstanding the 
refusal of some states to submit to its jurisdiction. 
Just as the distinctions between public and private sectors have blurred in recent years with 
regard to legitimate activities such as public-private partnerships, contracting out, and other 
mechanisms for the co-production of governance,17 there is a long tradition of public/private 
collaboration in criminal activity in furtherance of state interests. Administrators of the 
French Concession in Shanghai during the 1920s and 1930s relied upon the Green Gang to 
suppress industrial unrest and regulate drug markets.18 The US Central Intelligence Agency 
engaged burglars and criminals around the world to conduct break-ins and kidnappings, and 
enlisted mafia members in an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate Cuban President Fidel 
Castro.19 Toward the end of the Apartheid era, South African state security engaged criminal 
groups to assist with “sanctions busting” and with resisting ANC insurgents.20  
Hybrid forms of state-private collaboration may be situated along a continuum, the poles of 
which represent “purely” private activity on the one hand, and the state itself engaged in 
organized criminality on the other. Between these polar opposites, one may observe situations 
where the state turns a blind eye to private criminality; where it implicitly condones criminal 
activity; where the state actively encourages such activity, but at arm’s length; or where it 
systematically collaborates with its private criminal partners.  
Organized cybercrime 
By cyber crime, we refer broadly to criminal activity involving information systems as 
instruments or as targets of illegality. This would entail unlawful access to systems, 
interference with their lawful use, or theft or destruction of information contained therein. It 
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may also entail possession or transmission of prohibited content.21  For present purposes, the 
fundamental question is whether organized cyber crime has reached the scale and intensity to 
threaten national security. 
Digital technology has empowered individuals as never before. Singlehandedly, teenagers 
have succeeded in disabling air traffic control systems, shutting down major e-retailers, and 
manipulating trades on the NASDAQ stock exchange.22 What individuals can do, 
organizations can also do, and often better.  Just as legitimate organizations have become 
more efficient and effective through their use of digital technology, so too have criminal 
organizations. The Internet and related technologies lend themselves perfectly to coordination 
across a dispersed network. Moreover, the pervasiveness of digital technology has provided 
tools of crime, and opportunities for crime, that are without precedent. 
 
Organizational forms 
The blending of public and private in advanced industrial societies means that the space of 
cyber criminality is one of great fluidity. On one day, a professional cyber criminal may be 
working for a government, the next day for himself, and the day after that, for a criminal 
organization.  
The anonymity afforded by the internet makes it relatively easy to conceal one’s identity. 
Skilled hackers, whether employed by the state, by a criminal organization, or working on 
their own, are often able to avoid attribution.  As a result, when one’s information systems 
are subject to intrusion, one cannot be sure whether the intruder is a sole teenager, an 
organised criminal group, or agents of a foreign government. Indeed, two or more of these 
may be acting in concert, under arrangements of sponsorship or some hybrid form. Nor can 
one be confident of the physical location from which the attack originated. It has become a 
cliché to suggest that cyberspace knows no boundaries, and a crime can be committed against 
a target on the other side of the world as easily as a target in one’s own jurisdiction. 
The standard definition of organised crime, based on three or more persons in concert, does 
not extend to certain highly sophisticated forms of organization such as the mobilization of 
“botnets” (shorthand for robot network). This  involves an offender using malicious software 
to acquire control over a large number of computers (the largest including more than one 
million separate machines).23 Even though the individual and institutional custodians of 
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compromised computers may be unwitting participants in a criminal enterprise, some 
commentators maintain that botnets themselves should be considered a form of organised 
crime.24 
 
Criminal use of the Internet 
The Internet may be used for criminal activity in three basic ways. It can serve as the 
instrument of crime, the target of crime, and it can be used incidentally in furtherance of 
criminal activity. The three modes apply to both individual and organizational use, and are 
not mutually exclusive. A distinctive characteristic of cybercrime is its “borderless” nature; 
the offender, the victim, and the evidence of a crime may each be located in different physical 
locations around the world. 
The internet is commonly used as an instrument for attacking other computer systems. Most 
cyber crimes begin when an offender obtains unauthorised access to another system. Systems 
are often attacked in order to destroy or damage them and the information that they contain. 
This can serve the purpose of vandalism, protest, or activity in furtherance of other political 
objectives. One of the more common forms is the “distributed denial of service attack” 
(DDoS). This entails flooding a target computer system with a massive volume of 
information so that the system slows down significantly. Botnets are quite useful for such 
purposes, as are multiple coordinated service requests. 
 One example  of a botnet-initiated DDoS attack occurred in April 2007, when government 
servers in Estonia were seriously degraded for a number of hours. The attacks appear to have 
originated in Russia, and are alleged to have resulted from the collaboration of Russian youth 
organizations and Russian organized crime groups, condoned by the state, although the 
degree to which the Russian government was complicit in the attacks was unclear.   
This raises the question whether certain types of cybercrime may be considered acts of war. 
Traditionally, an act of war entails threat or use of force by one state against the territorial 
integrity or political independence of another. This has tended to involve armed invasion or 
air attack, recently by missiles or by unmanned aerial vehicles or drones. In 2010, it became 
apparent that the control systems supporting the Iranian Government’s nuclear enrichment 
program had been infected by malicious code, and as a result, a considerable number of 
fragile centrifuges had been destroyed.25   
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Insurgent and extremist groups have used internet technology as an instrument of theft in 
order to enhance their resource base.  The internet can also be used as a vehicle for fraud.  
Spurious investment solicitations, marriage proposals, and a variety of other fraudulent 
overtures are made daily by the hundreds of millions. Imam Samudra, convicted architect of 
the 2002 Bali bombings, reportedly called upon his followers to commit credit card fraud in 
order to finance militant activities.26  
In recent years, the internet has been used to communicate a wide variety of content deemed 
offensive to the point of criminal prohibition in one or more jurisdictions. Such material 
includes child pornography, neo Nazi propaganda, or advocacy of Tibetan independence, to 
specify but a few.  Jihadist propaganda and incitement messages also abound in cyberspace.  
Digital technology can also be used to obtain, copy and disseminate various forms of 
intellectual property. So-called information piracy involves appropriation of music, video, 
and software, and occurs today on a global scale. The software and entertainment industries 
allege that losses to such thefts have reached billions of dollars.27 
Information systems may be targeted for the data they contain, including banking and credit 
card details, commercial trade secrets, and classified information held by governments.  This 
too may begin with unauthorised access to a computer system. Theft of personal financial 
details has provided the basis for thriving markets in such data, which enable fraud on a 
significant scale.28 
The quest for state secrets is not limited to officials of rival states. Political espionage has 
often relied upon the engagement of private individuals to do some of the government’s 
“dirty work.” One of the earliest examples of cyber espionage involved a group of East 
German hackers who obtained access to computer systems at US defence installations on 
behalf of the KGB.29 More recently, private organizations have sought to obtain and to 
disseminate classified information as a matter of principle, specifically, the principle of 
freedom of information. Most prominent of these is Wikileaks.30 
Incidental use: As digital technology pervades modern society, we become increasingly 
dependent upon it to make our lives easier. Much of our ordinary communications and record 
keeping rely on the internet and related technologies. Just as digital technology enhances the 
efficiency of our ordinary legitimate activities, so too does it enhance the efficiency of 
criminal activities. Criminals use the Internet as a medium of communication in furtherance 
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of criminal conspiracies, or as a means of storing records or other information. Manufacturers 
of illicit drugs trade recipes over the Internet.31 The Internet is a convenient medium of 
communications for terrorists, as it is for law abiding individuals. Jihadi materials are 
reported to have been stored on the servers of the Arkansas Department of Highways and 
Transportation.32 The lengths to which some states will go in order to access online 
conversations between alleged terrorists (and incidentally, ordinary citizens) is quite 
substantial. The dramatic growth of the US National Security Agency is indicative.33 These 
efforts were not lost on Osama Bin Laden, who reportedly relied on couriers using Internet 
cafes as a means of communicating with his followers around the world.  
Organized cybercrime as a national security threat 
Digital technology has become pervasive, and vulnerability to cybercrime has increased 
commensurately. Nearly two decades have passed since one commentator observed that 
“everything depends on software.”34 We have already noted that critical infrastructure is now 
dependent upon digital technology. If one looks at some of the forms that cybercrime has 
taken in recent years, one can easily recognise the potential risk they pose to national 
security. The disruption of electronic commerce and banking facilities would threaten one of 
the major platforms of economic development in the new millennium.  One of the most 
significant developments of modern times is the extent to which digital technology has 
empowered ordinary people, even teenagers acting alone.35 Technologies of empowerment 
also benefit organizations. Anything an individual can do is also within the capacity of 
organizations, and then some. 
Military applications of internet technologies have been openly discussed since at least 
1998.36 Since then, the militarization of cyberspace has continued apace. An unknown 
number of nations are developing offensive cyber warfare capabilities, which can, inter alia, 
entail interference with command, control and communications, and disruption or destruction 
of critical infrastructure. In October, 2012, US Secretary of Defence Leon Panetta spoke of a 
“cyber-Pearl Harbor” at the hands of a hostile state or extremist group.37 States too engage in 
cyber-espionage. It was recently estimated that over 100 countries around the world engage 
in some form of this activity.38 
The vulnerability of governmental secrets to theft (notwithstanding the tendency of some 
keepers of these secrets to overstate their value) was most vividly illustrated by the 
publication of some 400,000 US State Department diplomatic cables by the organization 
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Wikileaks.39 It is unlikely that the duplication and widespread dissemination of such a huge 
body of information could have occurred without digital technology. Some would argue that 
the disclosure of classified information is ipso facto a threat to national security; others might 
contend that the act of classifying information is inherently subjective, and that transparency 
should take precedence. 
The following sections will provide a brief descriptive overview of specific cybercriminal 
activity attributed to organizations, including observations on the national security 
implications of each. The selected examples are not intended to be representative of the 
universe of organized cybercrime, but rather to be illustrative of the great diversity of 
organized criminal activity reliant on the internet, of their security repercussions, and of the 
motives of those who commit them. 
W0nderland was a members-only group that exchanged illicit images of children, until its 
interdiction by a multi-national police investigation named Operation Cathedral on 
September 2, 1998. Simultaneous raids in 14 countries revealed a group of 180 individuals 
from 49 countries around the world who collectively possessed over 750,000 illicit images of 
children and over 1,800 digitized videos depicting child abuse. The group had been 
established in the mid-1990s to facilitate file sharing of the images and videos.40 
Anonymous is a loose collective of anarchists based largely on a shared ethos of mischief and 
resentment of authority, who engage in what Professor Dorothy Denning referred to as 
‘hactivism.’41  The prevailing ethos of iconoclasm, if not nihilism, began to focus on 
prominent symbols. The chosen methods were website defacements and distributed denial of 
service attacks, complemented by online verbal abuse. Not surprisingly, the website of the 
U.S. Central Intelligence Agency represented an attractive target.  Imbued with the hacker 
ethos that information should be free, the group also targeted the secrecy of the Church of 
Scientology, the proprietary commercialism of the Motion Picture Association of America, 
and became a supporter of Wikileaks. When the U.S. Government prevailed upon various 
electronic payment service providers to discontinue processing of contributions to Wikileaks 
after its publication of secret US State Department messages, Anonymous orchestrated denial 
of service attacks against the complying sites.42 
“Drink or Die” was an international group of copyright pirates who illegally reproduced and 
distributed software, games and movies over the Internet. They were motivated less by profit 
than by their desire for recognition as the first group to distribute a perfect copy of a newly 
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pirated product.  Founded in Moscow in 1993, the group expanded internationally within 
three years, with members in more than 12 countries including Britain, Australia, Finland, 
Norway, Sweden, and the United States. Its approximately 65 members were technologically 
sophisticated, and included IT professionals skilled in security, programming and internet 
communications.43  
The ZeuS virus. Software engineers in Eastern Europe had refined malware known as the 
ZeuS virus.  This malicious code was used by Ukranian hackers to gain access to the 
computers of individuals employed in variety of small businesses, municipalities, and non-
government organizations in the United States. Target computers were compromised when 
the victim opened an apparently benign email message. With access to the victim’s bank 
account numbers and password details, principals in the Ukraine were able to log on to the 
target organizations’ bank accounts.  Accomplices of the Ukranian principals placed notices 
on Russian language websites inviting students resident in the United States to assist in 
transferring funds out of the country. These so-called “mules” were provided with counterfeit 
passports, and were directed to open accounts in false names in various U.S. financial 
institutions. When principals in the Ukraine transferred funds from legitimate account holders 
to the mules’ accounts, the mules were instructed to move the funds to accounts offshore, or 
in some cases, to smuggle the funds physically out of the United States. 44  
Dark Market was a forum for the exchange of credit card and banking details, malicious 
software, and related technology. Its website provided the infrastructure for an electronic 
bazaar, a meeting place for buyers and sellers of the illicit material.  The forum was founded 
in May, 2005 in order to take advantage of the criminal opportunities presented by the advent 
of electronic banking and the increasing use of credit and debit cards. Banking and card 
details were illicitly obtained by various means, including surreptitious recording with 
‘skimming’ devices, unauthorized access to personal or business information systems, or 
techniques of ‘social engineering’ where victims were persuaded to part with the details at the 
request of an ostensibly legitimate source.  At its peak, Dark Market was the world’s pre-
eminent English language ‘carding’ site, with over 2500 members from a number of countries 
around the world, including the United Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Russia, Turkey, 
Germany and France.45 
Operation Olympic Games is reportedly a collaboration between the US National Security 
Agency and its Israeli counterpart, Unit 8200, intended to disrupt the Iranian nuclear 
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enrichment program. It allegedly involved the clandestine insertion of an extremely complex 
and sophisticated set of software into communications and control systems at the Natanz 
nuclear facility. The software reportedly includes a capacity to monitor communications and 
processing activity, as well as the ability to corrupt control systems at the facility.  The 
operation succeeded in delaying the progress of uranium enrichment through remote 
controlled destruction of a number of centrifuges used in the process.  The secrecy 
surrounding the operation was compromised in part when the malicious software escaped 
because of a programming error.  Neither the United States nor the Israeli governments have 
yet to acknowledge the existence of the operation.46 
Ghost Net was the name given by a group of Canadian researchers in 2010 to a cyber-
espionage operation apparently operating from commercial internet accounts in China. The 
hackers compromised government computers in over 100 countries on several continents; 
they also targeted emails from the server of the Dalai Lama. The Chinese Government denied 
involvement, and there was no conclusive evidence to the contrary.  There is, however, some 
evidence of government complicity. Chinese officials have confronted expatriate dissidents 
returning to China with transcripts of internet chats in which they were involved during their 
absence.47 Whether the activity in question was the work of patriotic hackers acting 
unilaterally, or skilled individuals with guidance from state authorities who were otherwise 
acting at arm’s-length, remains unclear. Canadian investigators claim to have found evidence 
of links to two individuals in the underground hacking community of the PRC.48 
PLA Unit 61398 
In February 2013, the information security company Mandiant reported that a large scale 
program of industrial espionage had been undertaken in 2006 by Unit 61398 of the People’s 
Liberation Army. Based in Shanghai, this organization is alleged to have acquired a massive 
volume of data from a wide variety of industries in English speaking countries.  Information 
alleged to have been taken includes technical specifications, negotiation strategies, pricing 
documents and other proprietary data. One of the alleged targets, a major US beverage 
manufacturer, was planning in 2009 what was to have been the largest foreign purchase of a 
Chinese company to date.  It was reported that an apparently innocuous email to an executive 
of the US company contained a link, which when opened, allowed the attackers access to the 
company network. Sensitive information on pending negotiations was reportedly accessed by 
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Chinese intruders on a regular basis; the purchase did not eventuate. It is unclear whether the 
unit is staffed exclusively by military personnel or includes civilian contractors.49 
 
Conclusions  
 
The above examples of organized cyber criminality enable one to conclude that not all 
organizations acting illegally in cyberspace may be regarded as threats to national or 
international security.  Some activity is unquestionably annoying, offensive in the extreme, 
and/or harmful. There are online activities which, if writ large, might conceivably weaken the 
integrity and economy of states and thus come to be regarded as security threats.  Online 
paedophilia, no matter how heinous or distasteful one might regard it, does not occur on a 
scale at which a nation’s economy or social fabric is damaged. Nor is it likely ever to do so.  
The software and entertainment industries in the United States have sought to make the case 
that information piracy costs the domestic economy millions of dollars in lost profits, and has 
a chilling effect on entrepreneurialism and creativity world-wide.  However, the US economy 
is sufficiently diverse that its future strength will depend on other factors. Indeed, one could 
argue that piracy allows citizens of less developed countries to benefit from access to 
products that they would otherwise be unable to afford. By contrast, major, persistent 
industrial or political espionage on a wider scale may well threaten the security of the target 
state.50 Industrial espionage can weaken the international competitiveness of a company or of 
an industry sector. When the information in question relates to weapons systems, the security 
implications are obvious.  
Theft of credit card and banking details, were it to occur on a larger scale, would certainly 
impede commercial activity, with corresponding harm to a state’s economy. For the time 
being, however, online fraud appears manageable. Technologies of information security 
continue to be refined, and tech savvy members of the public, at least in developing countries, 
are able to protect themselves. On line banking and e-commerce continue to thrive. 
In less developed countries, however, where users are just entering the digital age, lack of 
awareness of cybersecurity may enhance the vulnerability of individuals and of organizations 
in both the public and private sectors. To the extent that the threat of cybercrime impedes the 
development of electronic commerce, it could contribute to the weakening of a nation’s  
security. 
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As far as organizations are concerned, it appears that the greatest threats to national security 
are posed by states themselves, either singlehandedly or in collaboration with skilled 
amateurs or sophisticated cybercriminals.  The activity reported to have led to the destruction 
of Iranian centrifuges would certainly be defined by authorities of that country (or those of 
any other nation on the receiving end of a similar attack) as a security threat. Nations on the 
receiving end of similar attacks might be inclined to regard them as acts of cyber-war.51  
The activities of Anonymous, such as eavesdropping on a conference call between law 
enforcement agents and attempts to shut down the website of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, have certainly been found annoying by authorities in the United States. On the scale 
at which they were conducted, such activities were certainly embarrassing, but would not 
constitute harm to  national security. Such activity, if undertaken persistently or on a larger 
scale, might send a message of state nonchalance at best, and incompetence at worst, and 
thereby invite imitation from many quarters. The potential for significant harm is therefore 
real. The threshold of objective threat would appear to be a function of the scope and 
intensity of criminal activity on the one hand, and the resilience of the state and its 
infrastructure on the other. 
The disclosures of Wikileaks may have impeded US diplomats from obtaining candid 
comments from local informants around the world.  Some of these disclosures appear to have 
enhanced the vulnerability of weak regimes, and to that end, organized cybercrime was 
certainly a threat to their security. Whether this will enhance or detract from the security of 
the United States remains to be seen.  
If organized cybercrime were to occur on a greater scale, it could lead to a weakening of trust 
in major public or private institutions. The fundamental question for our purposes is at what 
point does the nature and scale of online criminal activity (organized or otherwise) begin to 
constitute a security threat. National security is not a binary variable. The question is not “are 
you, or are you not, secure?” but rather “might a specific circumstance contribute to an 
enhancement or diminution of security?” 
Many of those criminals operating in cyberspace, alone or in organizations, were competent 
technicians before turning to crime. What is interesting is the relatively minor role that 
conventional “terrestrial” organized criminal groups have thus far played in cybercrime.52 
Their main use of internet technology appears to have been incidental, as media of 
communications and of record keeping. One has seen examples of conventional criminal 
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organizations engaging IT specialists for specific tasks. This pattern of engagement is not 
unlike that of large scale drug offenders who contract with chemists to assist in the 
refinement of heroin or the manufacture of synthetic drugs.  In one case, associates of the 
New York-based Bonnano crime family, were charged with various offences including the 
illegal manufacture of fraudulent checks, and fraud in connection with access devices.  The 
group included one individual with a background in computing who accessed data bases with 
a view towards identifying potential extortion victims.  He also used his computing skills in 
the production of counterfeit checks.53 Meanwhile, digital technology with direct criminal 
application is becoming more sophisticated and more widely accessible. The potential for 
malicious software kits or “exploits, ” to be used by, or sold commercially by, criminal 
organizations, is already significant and is destined to increase.54 There seems little doubt that 
that conventional organized criminals who have grown up in the digital age will embrace the 
technology as a matter of routine, if they have not already done so, for purposes both 
mundane and illicit. 
Given the current pervasiveness of digital technology, its accessibility to criminal 
organizations, and its utility for a variety of criminal ends, there seems little doubt that the 
potential threat to national and international security will persist. The challenge, as is the case 
with purely terrestrial matters, is to distinguish the real from the illusory. 
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